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ABSTRACT
This Article examines whether incorporating data mining
technologies in education can promote equality. Following many other
spheres in life, big data technologies that include creating, collecting,
and analyzing vast amounts of data about individuals are increasingly
being used in schools. This process has already elicited widespread
interest among scholars, parents, and the public at large. However,
this attention has largely focused on aspects of student privacy and
data protection and has overlooked the profound effects data mining
may have on educational equality. This Article analyzes the effects of
data mining on education equality by focusing on one educational
practice-ability grouping-that is already being transformed by
educational data mining.
Ability grouping is the practice of separating students into
classes or tracks according to their perceived academic abilities. While
some educators support the practice, arguing that it helps teachers
adjust to the needs of their students, critics argue that ability grouping
reinforces educational inequalities. Implicit biases that pervade
educational decision-making processes result in the overrepresentation
of students from racial and ethnic minorities, and students from poor
families, in lower tracks in which they receive inferior education and
limited opportunities.
Given the well-documented biases in traditional ability
grouping, data-driven ability grouping (DDAG)-the use of algorithms
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to inform assignment decisions-may be a step in the right direction.
However, as this Article demonstrates, the use of data mining
technologies for ability grouping creates a host of unique challenges in
terms of educational equality.
This Article argues that traditional doctrines of equal protection
will be unable to contend with the biases DDAG is likely to create.
Instead, this Article offers a novel approach to the legal regulation of
DDAG that involves integrating legal and technological expertise and
creating equality-sensitive algorithms. The combination between legal
and technological solutions can ensure DDAG decreases biases in
ability grouping and promotes educational equality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of grouping students according to their ability
affects millions of students in the United States each day.1 It shapes
crucial aspects of their education: the curriculum they study, the
resources they receive, the teachers who educate them, and the peers
with whom they interact.2 Critics of ability grouping insist that it
reinforces educational inequalities, stratifying students from racial
and ethnic minorities and students from poor families to lower tracks
in which they receive inferior schooling and limited opportunities.3
Proponents, on the other hand, argue teaching homogeneous classes is
more effective, as it allows teachers to adjust content and pedagogy to
the students' needs.4 All experts concede, however, the importance of
ensuring a grouping process that is free from biases and does not
aggravate racial or class segregation.5
Despite being one of the most controversial issues in education
for almost a century, the practice of ability grouping persists and has
thrived for the past decade.6 The resurgence of ability grouping
coincides with another momentous change in education-the
technological and information revolution.7 This development, which
influences educational practices in myriad ways, already affects
ability grouping practices in many schools around the country.8
1. TOM LOVELESS, BROWN CTR. ON EDUC. POLICY AT BROOKINGS, THE 2013 BROWN




3. See, e.g., JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY
233, 235, 238 (2d ed. 1985). For a detailed discussion, see infra Part II.B.
4. See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, ACADEMIC TRACKING: REPORT OF THE NEA EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITEE ON ACADEMIC TRACKING 8 (1990); Vivian Yee, Grouping Students by
Ability Regains Favor in Classroom, N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/10/education/grouping-students-by-ability-regains-favor-with-
educators.html?mcubz=l [https://perma.cc/E957-KCMN] (describing teachers' positive attitude
toward ability grouping as a strategy to cope with student diversity); see also Julian R. Betts, The
Economics of Tracking in Education, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 341,
341-81 (Eric A. Hanushek et al. eds., 2011) (discussing the challenges in empirical evidence
concerning tracking).
5. See, e.g., NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 4, at 2-4; Betts, supra note 4, at 326; Yee,
supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., LOVELESS, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that the frequency of using ability
grouping in fourth-grade reading instruction rose from 28 percent in 1998 to 71 percent in 2009).
7. See, e.g., Roger Riddell, What Trends Are Shaping Ed Tech in 2014?, EDUC. DIVE
(Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.educationdive.com/news/what-trends-are-shaping-ed-tech-in-
2014/223048/ [https://perma.cc/Q77J-FV5L].
8. See Crist6bal Romero & Sebastiin Ventura, Educational Data Mining: A Review of
the State-of-the-Art, 20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS. MAN & CYBERNETICS 1, 9 (2010); Milan
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Educational technologies that are increasingly being introduced into
schools generate vast amounts of student data, which are collected,
mined, and analyzed by algorithms through educational data mining
(EDM) techniques.9 The algorithm outputs can be used for various
purposes, including teacher evaluation, improving pedagogy,
informing education policy, and the practice that is the focus of this
Article: ability grouping.10
One of the most interesting questions raised by the use of EDM
for ability grouping is whether it will alleviate the biases that plague
traditional ability grouping and decrease the overrepresentation of
children from minority communities and poor families in the lower
educational tracks. These biases have troubled both educators and
legal scholars in the past, and while much attention has been devoted
to the topic, little progress has been made." The introduction of
data-driven ability grouping (DDAG) substantially changes the way
grouping is performed and therefore warrants renewed interest in the
topic. This Article examines the effects DDAG may have on
educational equality, relying on the developing literature pertaining to
the ethical and legal ramifications of big data and predictive analytics.
Within this body of literature, only sparse attention is given to the
educational arena, and the existing research focuses mostly on issues
of privacy, data protection, and preventing the monetization of student
information.12 This Article addresses this gap in scholarship and
brings together several distinct areas of scholarship-
antidiscrimination law, education law, and technology law-the
integration of which introduces novel issues of importance for each
area of law.
Vukicevic et al., Grouping Higher Education Students with RapidMiner, in RAPIDMINER: DATA
MINING USE CASES AND BUSINESS ANALYTICS APPLICATIONS 185, 185 (Markus Hofmann & Ralf
Klinkenberg eds., 2013). For a detailed discussion of this practice see infra Part III.A.
9. See BARBARA MEANS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., USE OF EDUCATION DATA AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL: FROM ACCOUNTABLITY TO INSTRUCTIONAL IMPROVEMENT 2 (2010),
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/evalltech/use-of-education-data/use-of-education-data.pdf
[https://perma.ce/U4XN-NRJJ]; Vukicevic et al., supra note 8, at 185.
10. See Romero & Ventura, supra note 8, at 3-11.
11. See Mary Cipriano-Walter, Falling off the Track: How Ability Tracking Leads to
Intra-School Segregation, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 25, 47 (2016); Anthony D. Greene, Tracking
Work: Race-Ethnic Variation in Vocational Course Placement and Consequences for Academic
and Career Outcomes, 1 INT'L J. EDUC. STUD. 9, 11 (2014).
12. See generally Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, The Ethics of Student Privacy:
Building Trust for Ed Tech, 21 INT'L REV. INFO. ETHICS 25 (2014); Elana Zeide, Student Privacy
Principles for the Age of Big Data: Moving Beyond FERPA and FIPPS, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 339
(2016); Joel Reidenberg et al., Privacy and Cloud Computing in Public Schools, CTR. L. & INFO.
POL'Y, Dec. 2013, http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edulclip/2.
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This Article argues DDAG offers significant promise by
potentially removing prejudice from educational decisions, thus
offsetting implicit biases that teachers may unwittingly hold. A recent
study examined an algorithm-based system called the Education
Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS), used for assigning
students to different tracks in eighth-grade mathematics.13 The study
found that the algorithm assigned students to a higher track when the
students otherwise would not have been identified as suitable for the
track, thus increasing the proportion of children from racial minorities
and low socioeconomic status in the higher track.14
Despite the promise it extends, DDAG creates a host of unique
challenges in terms of equality of opportunity. Studies on data mining
and predictive analytics in other domains such as crime prevention,
banking, and insurance suggest that instead of eliminating social
biases, algorithms recreate them.15  To generate predictions,
algorithms use historical datasets from which they infer the attributes
of potential criminals, potential reckless drivers, or debtors who are
likely to fail to pay their debt.16 When historical datasets are racially
biased, the algorithm's decisions simply mirror those biases.17
Additionally, algorithms rely on what data they have.18
Students from a privileged background have better access to digital
devices outside of school, meaning they will likely register more
entries into the system and record more academic interaction and task
engagement.19 These additional entries consequently have a positive
13. See Shaun M. Dougherty et al., Middle School Math Acceleration and Equitable
Access to Eighth-Grade Algebra: Evidence from the Wake County Public School System, 37 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 80S, 81S (2015), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
pdf/10.3102/0162373715576076 [https://perma.cclP2MG-DFM8]. According to a report on the
company's website, EVAAS is widely used to place students in eighth-grade algebra. Expanding
Eighth-Grade Algebra Participation, SAS INST. INC., https://www.sas.com/en-us/customers/wake-
forest-rolesville.html [https://perma.cc/22PW-AM8C] (last visited Sept. 3, 2017); see also SAS,
EVAAS@ FOR K-12: STATISTICAL MODELS 3 (2016),
https://evaas.sas.com/support/EVAASStatisticalModels.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV6Z-RQZT]. For
further discussion of EVAAS, see infra Part III.B.
14. See Dougherty et al., supra note 13, at 81S. The study also found that the rates of
success did not decline subsequently. See id. at 93S.
15. See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671, 674 (2016). For a detailed discussion, see infra Part III.B.
16. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 680.
17. See FAISAL KAMIRAN & INDRE ZLIOBAITE, Explainable and Non-Explainable
Discrimination in Classification, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY:
DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES 155, 156 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013).
18. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 674.
19. Cf. id. at 686 n.57.
2017] 91
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effect on the algorithm system's outputs about those students.20
Students from a privileged background are also considerably more
digitally literate, which results in better functioning in a digital
environment.21 These disparities do not reflect an actual gap in
academic ability; therefore, they cause the algorithm's prediction to be
biased against children from poor families or racial minorities.22
Finally, data-driven decision-making (DDDM) may create new
classes of children who are disadvantaged. Although law is primarily
concerned with biases against students belonging to groups that are
historically socially excluded, such as racial minorities or immigrants,
the Authors contend that algorithmic decision-making may create new
groups that are systematically unfairly disadvantaged. If, for some
reason, children who are color blind or who engage in after-school
sports are less likely to succeed on computerized tasks and, therefore,
the algorithmic predictions are less favorable for them, DDDM may be
detrimental to their educational prospects, and they may be
discriminated against in ability grouping processes.
In at least one sense, the fact that algorithmic decision-making
is widely believed to be scientific and objective makes biases in it
worse than biases in traditional decision-making. Inequalities that
result from DDDM may be perceived as inevitable or justified. This
problem is especially challenging in the educational domain, wherein
assignment decisions reflect-and influence-children's abilities.23 By
determining the curriculum a child is taught, the skills she develops,
the peers she interacts with, the expectations teachers have of her,
and the expectations she has of herself, the algorithm's prediction is
self-fulfilling.
In light of these concerns it seems reasonable to turn to law to
ensure DDAG decreases biases and overrepresentation of minorities in
the lower tracks. This, the Authors argue, cannot be achieved through
the traditional doctrines concerning equal protection. The existing
equal protection doctrines have been largely ineffective in challenging
traditional ability grouping practices and, we argue, are even less
likely to appropriately address the challenges of DDAG.24
The solution instead lies in the combination of technological
solutions and legal regulation, both of which should be performed at
the stage of the design and use of algorithms. In traditional methods
20. See Jonas Lerman, Response, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
55, 56 (2013).
21 Id. at 57.
22. Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 673.
23. See Dougherty et al., supra note 13, at 81S.
24. See infra Part IV.
92 [Vol. 20:1:87
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of ability grouping performed by humans, it is almost impossible to
impose rules concerning which data to use (and which to disregard).
It is also extremely difficult to consciously assign a specific weight to
each piece of information.25 Teachers use student grades, tests, and
their own impressions to make decisions.26 Biases are (one hopes)
subconscious and unintended, but are hard to avoid. By using
algorithms, on the other hand, decision-making is structured and
technologically determined. Designers can define which attributes are
taken into consideration, which are disregarded, and the weight the
algorithm should assign to each. Algorithmic decision-making even
enables programmers to determine the desired end result in terms of
group representation.2 7 Therefore, involvement of legal and normative
considerations at the design stage can be effective in decreasing biases
and improving outcomes in terms of equality.28
Information scientists have already begun seeking
technological tools to reduce biased decision-making.2 9 These include
removing suspect attributes (such as race or gender)30 and attributes
that correlate with suspect attributes (zip code may correlate with
race, for example)31 from the datasets. Another possibility involves
manipulating historical datasets from which algorithms learn their
predictions by recognizing and correcting biased decisions.32
Additionally, algorithms may be able to reshape grouping entirely by,
for example, replacing the traditional criterion of academic
performance with other attributes previously impossible to ascertain,
such as different learning styles. This kind of grouping may promote
25. Research from a completely different context shows that judicial instruction to jurors
to ignore inadmissible evidence does not eliminate the impact of that evidence on jury verdicts.
See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard
Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (2006).
26. John N. Drowatzky, Tracking and Ability Grouping in Education, 10 J.L. & EDUC.
43, 45-47 (1981). These decisions are also affected by parental involvement. See Elizabeth L.
Useem, Middle Schools and Math Groups: Parents'Involvement in Children's Placement, 65 SOc.
EDUC. 263, 275 (1992).
27. Sicco Verwer & Toon Calders, Introducing Positive Discrimination in Predictive
Models, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND
PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES, supra note 17, at 263, 263.
28. Id.
29. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 716.
30. Toon Calders & Indre Zliobaite, Why Unbiased Computational Processes Can Lead to
Discriminative Decision Procedures, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES, supra note 17, at 43, 45.
31. Id. at 47; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 691-92.
32. Sara Hajian & Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Direct and Indirect Discrimination Prevention
Methods, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND
PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES, supra note 17, at 241, 247; Verwer & Calders, supra note 27, at
255, 263.
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the goal of facilitating effective teaching without creating racial and
class segregation.
Technological solutions such as these, however, involve
numerous normative decisions that cannot be divorced from legal
doctrine. It requires, for example, determining which classes are
protected, whether unequal outcomes constitute an actionable
wrongdoing, and whether affirmative action is permissible. These
legal issues, among others, must inform the algorithm designers'
decisions. Together, technological and legal regulation can potentially
improve the ability grouping process and promote educational
equality.
This Article unfolds as follows: Part II describes the current
practice of ability grouping and the biases that pervade it. Part III
introduces DDAG, explains how it is performed, and discusses
whether it is likely to decrease biases in ability grouping. Part IV
discusses the existing evidence on biases in predictive analytics and
also assesses ome possible technological solutions. Part V addresses
the role the law can play to ensure that DDAG is used to promote
equal educational opportunity and then briefly concludes.
II. THE PRACTICE OF ABILITY GROUPING
A. What Is Ability Grouping?
One of the greatest challenges of comprehensive education lies
in the wide variation of students' innate abilities, knowledge, and
learning styles.33  Providing instruction suitable for all
students-sufficiently challenging for them but not overwhelming-is
an excruciating task. Faced with this challenge, many education
systems divide students into groups based on their academic ability,
thus decreasing heterogeneity in the classroom.34 Teachers are then
33. See OAKES, supra note 3, at 3.
34. See id. ("Tracking is the process whereby students are divided into categories so that
they can be assigned in groups to various kinds of classes."); Patrick Akos et al., Early
Adolescents' Aspirations and Academic Tracking: An Exploratory Investigation, 11 PROF. SCH.
COUNSELING 57, 58 (2007) (describing a tracking policy as involving a school organization
structure that increases the homogeneity of instructional groups by stratifying students by
curriculum standards, educational and career goals, or ability); Adam Gamoran et al., An
Organizational Analysis of the Effects of Ability Grouping, 32 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 687, 688 (1995)
("Ability grouping is the practice of dividing students for instruction according to their purported
capacities for learning.").
In its widest interpretation, ability grouping includes programs for the gifted on the one
hand and placement in special education on the other. See Akos et al., supra, at 58. While the
Authors do not refer to these further in this Article, research has found biases in these decisions
too; therefore, some of the discussion applies to these cases. See Jesse 0. Erwin & Frank C.
94 [Vol. 20:1:87
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able to match the content, pace, and complexity of their classes to
their students, who are all, supposedly, more or less at the same
ability level.3 5
Ability grouping can take various forms that differ on several
dimensions: it can be flexibly performed ad hoc within a diverse
classroom for a specific task and dissolve immediately after
completion of the task.36 Conversely, ability grouping can be fixed
when students are assigned to separate classes, tracks, or schools from
which there is little possibility to move.37 A second and related
dimension concerns the scope of separation. In some cases, grouping
entails assignment to completely different schools or tracks in which
no mixed ability learning or social interaction takes place.38 In other
cases, schools are comprehensive and ability grouping is used only for
specific courses.39
Another difference among types of ability grouping policy
concerns the age at which ability grouping takes place. In Germany
and Austria, for example, students are tracked into separate schools
Worrell, Assessment Practices and the Underrepresentation of Minority Students in Gifted and
Talented Education, 30 J. PSYCHOEDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT 74, 74-75 (2012) (demonstrating
the underrepresentation of minority children in gifted programs); Donna Y. Ford, The
Underrepresentation of Minority Students in Gifted Education: Problems and Promises in
Recruitment and Retention, 32 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 4, 4 (1998) (demonstrating also the
underrepresentation of minority children in gifted programs); Robert A. Garda, Jr., The New
IDEA: Shifting Education Paradigms to Achieve Racial Equality in Special Education, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 1071, 1090 (2005) (discussing racial biases in placement of children in special education).
35. JUDITH IRESON & SUSAN HALLAM, ABILITY GROUPING IN EDUCATION 152 (2001);
NAT'L EDUC. AsS'N, supra note 4, at 8; Garry Hornby et al., Policies and Practices of Ability
Grouping in New Zealand Intermediate Schools, 26 SUPPORT FOR LEARNING 92, 92 (2011).
36. See Saiying Steenbergen-Hu et al., What One Hundred Years of Research Says About
the Effects of Ability Grouping and Acceleration on K-12 Students' Academic Achievement:
Findings of Two Second-Order Meta-Analyses, 86 REV. EDUC. RES. 849, 850 (2016).
37. Id.; see also Maureen T. Hallinan et al., Ability Grouping and Student Learning, 6
BROOKINGS PAPERS EDUC. POL'Y 95, 103 (2003). Assignment to lower-track courses can also
cause a "locking out" effect when assignment to higher-level courses is conditioned on
prerequisite course completion. See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 4, at 9; George Ansalone,
Schooling, Tracking, and Inequality, 7 J. CHILD. & POVERTY 33, 42 (2001). Some researchers use
the term "tracking" to denote ability grouping that involves completely separate and relatively
fixed classification. See OAKES, supra note 3, at 3; Akos et al., supra note 34, at 58; Gamoran et
al., supra note 34, at 690. Other researchers use the two terms "tracking" and "ability grouping"
interchangeably. See Steenbergen-Hu et al., supra note 36, at 850. This Article uses the more
general term "ability grouping."
38. Volker Meier & Gabriela Schittz, The Economics of Tracking and Non-Tracking 4
(Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research at the Univ. of Munich, Working Paper No. 50, 2007).
39. Robert E. Slavin, Ability Grouping and Student Achievement in Elementary Schools:
A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 57 REV. EDUC. RES. 293, 295 (1987).
2017] 95
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at the early age of fourth grade, whereas other educational systems
are comprehensive until the higher grades.4 0
There is no necessary link between ability grouping and
curriculum differentiation, so ability grouping may vary based on the
various content and skills students are exposed to in their group.4 1
For example, when grouping first-grade children according to their
reading ability for tutoring sessions, the goal is to promote their
reading skills. Although there may be some differences in the reading
material children are given, the curriculum is ultimately the same and
the pedagogical aims are identical. The only major difference lies in
the pace of progress. Other instances of ability grouping involve
completely different curricula and educational goals wherein students
acquire different skills and capacities.42
Ability grouping in the United States, like other issues in
education policy, varies according to local policy. 4 3 As a rule, however,
most US students attend comprehensive schools. Ability grouping
does not, therefore, usually involve extreme separation and happens
either within classrooms (in elementary schools for reading and math)
or by course assignment in middle schools and high schools.44
B. Ability Grouping and Educational Equality
For over three decades, education researchers have fiercely
debated the effectiveness of ability grouping, and the jury is still out
on its effects for educational attainment.45 While some studies have
40. See Meier & Schiitz, supra note 38, at 2. Ability grouping can sometimes transcend
the classic division into grades with cross-grade grouping-an option to address high-ability
students' need for accelerated teaching in certain topics. James A. Kulik & Chen-Lin C. Kulik,
Meta-Analytic Findings on Grouping Programs, 36 GIFTED CHILD Q. 73, 75 (1992).
41. Janet Ward Schofield, International Evidence on Ability Grouping with Curriculum
Differentiation and the Achievement Gap in Secondary Schools, 112 TCHRS. C. REC. 1492, 1496
(2010).
42. Id.
43. SAMUEL ROUNDFIELD LUCAS, TRACKING INEQUALITY: STRATIFICATION AND MOBILITY
IN AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOLS 158 (1999).
44. See id. at 20; Sean Kelly, The Contours of Tracking in North Carolina, 90 HIGH SCH.
J. 15, 25 (2007); Kulik & Kulik, supra note 40, at 75.
45. Compare Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas & Michael Kremer, Peer Effects, Teacher
Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 1739, 1740 (2011) (finding large and lasting positive effects on the achievement
of high- and low-achieving students alike), with Robert E. Slavin, Ability Grouping in the Middle
Grades: Achievement Effects and Alternatives, 93 ELEMENTARY SCH. J. 535, 535 (1993) (reviewing
twenty-seven studies concerning middle school and finding almost no difference between
students who were grouped according to ability and those who studied in heterogeneous classes).
[Vol. 20:1:8796
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found positive effects for students studying in homogeneous classes,46
others have found few or no such effects.4 7 Various studies suggest
grouping benefits students on higher tracks, whereas students on the
lower tracks have no comparable gains48 and are even disadvantaged
by the separation.49
Overshadowing the debate on ability grouping effectiveness is
the concern that it creates and worsens educational inequality.50 Two
related questions arise here: first, whether ability grouping
contributes to widening the gap between high-ability and low-ability
46. See KELLY PUZIO & GLENN COLBY, SOC'Y FOR RESEARCH ON EDUC. EFFECTIVENESS,
THE EFFECTS OF WITHIN CLASS GROUPING ON READING ACHIEVEMENT: A META-ANALYTIC
SYNTHESIS (2010) (finding a positive effect for within-class grouping in reading instruction);
Duflo, Dupas & Kremer, supra note 45, at 1740; Yiping Lou et al., Within-Class Grouping: A
Meta-Analysis, 66 REV. EDUC. RES. 423, 451 (1996) (finding that within-class ability grouping
improved academic achievement); Lynn M. Mulkey et al., The Long-Term Effects of Ability
Grouping in Mathematics: A National Investigation, 8 SOC. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 137, 137 (2005)
(noting that ability grouping in mathematics has persistent instructional benefits for all
students); Courtney A. Collins & Li Gan, Does Sorting Students Improve Scores? An Analysis of
Class Composition 1 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18848, 2013),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8848 [https://perma.cc/QP4B-EEGL] (noting the performance of
both high- and low-performing students significantly improved in math and reading).
47. See Slavin, supra note 45, at 535; Robert E. Slavin, Achievement Effects of Ability
Grouping in Secondary Schools: A Best-Evidence Synthesis, 60 REV. EDUC. RES. 471, 471 (1990)
(reviewing twenty-nine studies examining the effect of ability grouping on achievement in
secondary schools, and finding zero effect); see also Julian R. Betts & Jamie L. Shkolnik, The
Effects of Ability Grouping on Student Achievement and Resource Allocation in Secondary
Schools, 19 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (finding no overall effect of formal grouping policies on
student achievement).
48. Adam Gamoran et al., Upgrading High School Mathematics Instruction: Improving
Learning Opportunities for Low-Achieving, Low-Income Youth, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY
ANALYSIS 325, 325 (1997) (stating that growth in student achievement in college-preparatory
classes is significantly larger than in general track classes); Chen-Lin C. Kulik & James A.
Kulik, Effects of Ability Grouping on Secondary School Students: A Meta-Analysis of Evaluation
Findings, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 415, 425 (1982); Carolyn M. Shields, A Comparison Study of
Student Attitudes and Perceptions in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Classrooms, 24 ROEPER
REV. 115, 119 (2002) (finding that grouping benefits students with high ability in terms of both
academic achievement and attitudes concerning themselves and school).
49. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, HIGH STAKES: TESTING FOR TRACKING, PROMOTION, AND
GRADUATION 102 (Jay P. Heubert & Robert M. Hauser eds., 1999); Estela Godinez Ball6n, Racial
Differences in High School Math Track Assignment, 7 J. LATINOs & EDUC. 272, 272 (2008);
Robert L. Linn, Assessments and Accountability, 29 EDUC. RESEARCHER 4, 14 (2000); Christy
Lleras & Claudia Rangel, Ability Grouping Practices in Elementary School and African
American/Hispanic Achievement, 115 AM. J. EDUC. 279, 279 (2009) (stating that the progress of
students in low-achieving reading groups decreases through the years, thus enlarging the
achievement gap); Frances R. Spielhagen, Algebra for Everyone? Student Perceptions of Tracking
in Mathematics, 5 MIDDLE GRADES RES. J. 213, 214 (2010).
50. Eric A. Hanushek & Ludger WoBmann, Does Educational Tracking Affect
Performance and Inequality? Differences-in-Differences Evidence Across Countries 10 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11124, 2005).
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students, and second, how ability grouping influences students from
disadvantaged families and minority groups.
Most writers on grouping have concluded grouping students by
academic performance typically contributes to widening the
achievement gap between high-level and low-level classes over time,
even after controlling for initial differences in ability.51  Ability
grouping leads to inequality in educational resources: students on
lower tracks, despite their need for extra help, tend to receive fewer
resources than students on the higher tracks,52 are taught by less
experienced teachers,53 and suffer from negative peer effects.54
Further, research suggests students on lower tracks are exposed to
curricula and learning experiences inferior to those offered on higher
tracks.55 Instruction in low-ability classes tends to be comprised of
low-level pedagogy-focusing on isolated bits of information and
51. See Michael Becker et al., Is Early Ability Grouping Good for High-Achieving
Students' Psychosocial Development? Effects of the Transition into Academically Selective
Schools, 106 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 555, 556 (2014); Adam Gamoran & Mark Berendes, The Effects
of Stratification in Secondary Schools: Synthesis of Survey and Ethnographic Research, 57 REV.
EDUC. RES. 415, 415 (1987); Adam Gamoran & Robert D. Mare, Secondary School Tracking and
Educational Inequality: Compensation, Reinforcement, or Neutrality?, 94 AM. J. SOC. 1146, 1146
(1989); Hallinan et al., supra note 37, at 104; Thomas B. Hoffer, Middle School Ability Grouping
and Student Achievement in Science and Mathematics, 14 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS
205, 223 (1992); Joseph Murphy & Philip Hallinger, Equity as Access to Learning: Curricular
and Instructional Treatment Differences, 21 J. CURRICULUM STUD. 129, 129 (1989); James E.
Rosenbaum, Social Implications of Educational Grouping, 8 REV. RES. EDUC. 361, 368 (1980);
Alan C. Kerckhoff, Effects of Ability Grouping in Secondary School in Great Britain 30 (Nat'1
Child Dev. Study, Working Paper No. 9, 1986).
52. See Karl L. Alexander et al., Curriculum Tracking and Educational Stratification:
Some Further Evidence, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 47, 64 (1978).
53. See JOAN E. TALBERT & MICHELE ENNIS, STANFORD CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON THE
CONTEXT OF TEACHING, TEACHER TRACKING: EXACERBATING INEQUALITIES IN THE HIGH SCHOOL
16 (1990); Merrilee K. Finley, Teachers and Tracking in a Comprehensive High School, 57 Soc.
EDUC. 233, 242 (1984); Richard Harker & Peter Tymms, The Effects of Student Composition on
School Outcomes, 15 SCH. EFFECTIVENESS & SCH. IMPROVEMENT 177, 179-80 (2004).
54. See Yehezkel Dar & Nura Resh, Classroom Intellectual Composition and Academic
Achievement, 23 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 357, 357 (1986). Some studies show that grouping students by
ability results in a reduction of peer effects in general. Ron Zimmer, A New Twist in the
Educational Tracking Debate, 22 ECON. EDUC. REV. 307, 307 (2003); Ron W. Zimmer & Eugenia
F. Toma, Peer Effects in Private and Public Schools Across Countries, 19 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 75, 75 (2000). Others, however, show that grouping creates a resource-rich environment
for high-level students and deprives students on the lower tracks of an important classroom
resource-namely, the positive input of high-ability peers. See Dar & Resh, supra, at 357; Adam
Gamoran & Martin Nystrand, Tracking, Instruction and Achievement, 21 INTL J. EDUC. RES.
217, 217 (1994); Sean Kelly & William Carbonaro, Curriculum Tracking and Teacher
Expectations: Evidence from Discrepant Course Taking Models, 15 SOC. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 271, 273
(2012); Mieke Van Houtte, Tracking Effects on School Achievement: A Quantitative Explanation
in Terms of the Academic Culture of School Staff, 110 AM. J. EDUC. 354, 359 (2004).
55. See Gamoran et al., supra note 34, at 692.
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workbook usage56-that does not develop the students' critical and
abstract thinking skills.57 Being placed on low academic tracks is also
related to higher dropout rates,5 8 and student misbehavior was
disciplined more severely when it occurred on the lower tracks.59
Another long-term negative effect associated with being placed
on a lower academic track concerns labeling. Grouping dictates
teachers' expectations from students and also students'
self-expectations.60  These expectations not only affect students'
self-esteem but also influence their actual academic performance.61 In
most cases, once students are placed on a lower academic track in the
early grades, they remain there through high school, where the
differences between tracks become more pronounced.62  Students
assigned to lower-track courses often find themselves "locked out" of
higher-level courses that set conditions for enrollment.63 As a result,
gaps in student achievement tend to widen as students progress
through middle and high school, reflecting both the differentiated
curriculum and the vast differences in learning opportunities
associated with participation in the honors and college preparatory
programs available in those schools.64 This evidence raises grave
concerns that instead of improving the academic abilities and
attainment of students with lower abilities and investing extra
resources in them, ability grouping in fact further disadvantages those
students.
The findings are all the more troubling since considerable
research shows ability grouping is also detrimental to the educational
opportunities of children from poor backgrounds and racial
56. See id.
57. See OAKES, supra note 3, at 76.
58. See Daniel J. Losen, Silent Segregation in Our Nation's Schools, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 517, 522 (1999); Jacob Werblow et al., On the Wrong Track: How Tracking Is Associated
with Dropping out of High School, 46 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE EDUC. 270, 272 (2013).
59. See MARY HAYWOOD METZ, CLASSROOMS AND CORRIDORS: THE CRISIS OF AUTHORITY
IN DESEGREGATED SECONDARY SCHOOLS 106 (1978).
60. Alexander et al., supra note 52, at 60; Harker & Tymms, supra note 53, at 179.
61. Aaron M. Pallas et al., Ability-Group Effects: Instructional, Social, or Institutional?,
67 SOC. EDUC. 27, 28 (1994) (noting that students in high-ability classes typically are exposed to
a more positive learning environment, in terms of attitude, aspirations, and self-esteem, than
those in low-ability classes); see also Losen, supra note 58, at 522.
62. See Alexander et al., supra note 52, at 56; Doug Archbald & Elizabeth N.
Farley-Ripple, Predictors of Placement in Lower Level Versus Higher Level High School
Mathematics, 96 HIGH SCH. J. 33, 48 (2012); Sean Kelly, The Black-White Gap in Mathematics
Course Taking, 82 SOC. EDUC. 47, 61 (2009).
63. See NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 4, at 9; Ansalone, supra note 37, at 42.
64. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Anthony D. Greene, Connecting Pieces of the Puzzle:
Gender Differences in Black Middle School Students' Achievement, 75 J. NEGRO EDUC. 34, 34
(2006).
2017] 99
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
minorities.65 These students are heavily overrepresented in lower
tracks, whereas students from privileged backgrounds tend to be
assigned in higher proportions to higher tracks.66
The fact that children from disadvantaged backgrounds are
overrepresented in lower tracks can be attributed to one of two causes.
The first, pregrouping causes, are the social circumstances that render
children from marginalized groups less equipped for school.
Individuals from disadvantaged groups tend to have less nurturing
environments, which results in diminished abilities when they enter
school.67 The grouping process at school merely reflects the social
inequality. The second possible cause for overrepresentation lies
within the process of ability grouping itself-racial and class biases
held by educators result in students who could have been successful
on the higher tracks being assigned to lower tracks.68
Clearly, these two causes are not mutually exclusive.
Longstanding social inequality is certainly to blame for inequalities in
educational capabilities for children of different social groups.
However, there is also evidence that educational decision-making is
deeply afflicted with racial and class biases. This Article focuses on
the second cause-namely, biases in decision-making-and examines
whether the use of EDM coupled with appropriate legal regulation is
likely to overcome biases.
Well-documented evidence points to bias in traditional
educational decision-making against racial minorities,69 children of
low social class,70 and female students.71 Though teachers may be
wholly unaware of their biases, they tend to judge equally qualified
students from racial minorities as less academically and socially
65. See, e.g., Ansalone, supra note 37, at 33; Losen, supra note 58, at 519; Hanushek &
Wo1mann, supra note 50, at 13.
66. See Ansalone, supra note 37, at 39-40; Cipriano-Walter, supra note 11, at 27;
Greene, supra note 11; Losen, supra note 58, at 517-18; Jeannie Oakes, Two Cities' Tracking
and Within-School Segregation, 96 TCHRS. C. REC. 681 (1995).
67. JOHN ERMISCH, MARKUS JANTTI & TIMOTHY M. SMEEDING, FROM PARENTS TO
CHILDREN: THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ADVANTAGE 181 (2012); ANNETTE
LAREAU, UNEQUAL CHILDHOODS: CLASS, RACE, AND FAMILY LIFE 13 (ed. 2003).
68. See OAKES, supra note 3, at 247; JEANNIE OAKES & AMY STUART WELLS, BEYOND THE
TECHNICALITIES OF SCHOOL REFORM: POLICY LESSONS FROM DETRACKING SCHOOLS 23 (1996).
69. See Hallinan et al., supra note 37, at 103; Terry Kershaw, The Effects of Educational
Tracking on the Social Mobility of African Americans, 23 J. BLACK STUD. 152, 160 (1992).
70. George Ansalone, Keeping on Track: A Reassessment of Tracking in the Schools, 7
RACE GENDER & CLASS EDUC. 108, 112 (2000).
71. Kar L. Alexander & Edward L. McDill, Selection and Allocation Within Schools:
Some Causes and Consequences of Curriculum Placement, 41 AM. Soc. REV. 963, 973 (1976)
(finding that gender influences ability grouping decisions after controlling for ability); Caroline
Hodges Persell, Sophia Catsambis & Peter W. Cookson, Jr., Differential Asset Conversion: Class
and Gendered Pathways to Selective Colleges, 65 SOC. EDUC. 208, 221 (1992).
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competent than nonminority students, thus underestimating the
students' actual academic abilities.72 These biases pervade all spheres
of schooling. African American children, for example, are more likely
to be disciplined for misconduct that white children could get away
with-and to suffer more severe punishments for similar behavior.73
Biases are also connected to decisions concerning assignment to
special education74 : African American children are three times more
likely to be found in need of special education when diagnosis of the
disability involves subjective teacher evaluations.75 Such biases do
not come forth for more "objective" disabilities such as sensory or
physical.76 Further, while the legal treatment of discrimination and
attitudes in society regarding racial equality have developed
significantly since these topics were first studied, implicit biases still
pervade decision-making.7 7
Students from socially disadvantaged backgrounds are also
overrepresented in low-ability tracks owing to differences between
affluent and disadvantaged families in parental involvement.78 Poor
parents or parents belonging to minority groups are less likely to
challenge assignment decisions than middle- and upper-class
parents.79 Affluent parents are more involved in educational decisions
and are more assertive; therefore, affluent parents are more effective
72. See Regina Cecelia McCombs & Judith Gay, Effects of Race, Class, and IQ
Information on Judgments of Parochial Grade School Teachers, 128 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 647, 647
(1988); La Vonne I. Neal et al., The Effects of African American Movement Styles on Teachers'
Perceptions and Reactions, 37 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 49, 55 (2003); Felicia R. Parks & Janice H.
Kennedy, The Impact of Race, Physical Attractiveness, and Gender on Education Majors' and
Teachers' Perceptions of Student Competence, 37 J. BLACK STUD. 936, 937 (2007); Linda van den
Bergh et al., The Implicit Prejudiced Attitudes of Teachers: Relations to Teacher Expectations and
the Ethnic Achievement Gap, 47 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 497, 500 (2010).
73. See Russell J. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender
Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 334 (2002).
74. See Steve Knotek, Bias in Problem Solving and the Social Process of Student Study
Teams: A Qualitative Investigation, 37 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 2, 12 (2003).
75. Garda, supra note 34, at 1079 (2005).
76. Id. at 1078.
77. See Hallinan et al., supra note 37, at 96. Moreover, studies show that even when
schools employ a set of criteria in placement decisions (most often grades, test scores, teacher
and counselor recommendations, parental preference, and student choice), nonacademic factors
play a significant role in determining the ability group level to which a student is assigned. Id.;
see also Paula Stern & Richard J. Shavelson, Reading Teachers' Judgments, Plans, and Decision
Making, 37 READING TCHR. 280, 281 (1983). Random factors-such as students' social skills,
physical attractiveness, and style of dress-affect teachers' evaluations of student ability. See
Ansalone, supra note 70, at 127.
78. See Losen, supra note 58, at 525.
79. See id.
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in providing access to high-ability programs and gifted education for
their children.80
Ethnic and class segregation is not merely a result of ability
grouping but was also one of the motivations for ability grouping
through the years.81 In the early days of comprehensive schooling,
ability grouping was a means to separate lower-class and immigrant
children-who were largely uneducated-from those of the educated
gentry.82  After Brown v. Board of Education,83 ability grouping
expanded dramatically, coming to represent a means of circumventing
desegregation by substituting intra-school segregation for what had
previously existed between schools.84 Despite typically being justified
by educators as a response to student heterogeneity, the practice was
undergirded by beliefs about race and class, and politically defended
by white, middle-class parents seeking to preserve their privilege.85
Ability grouping is therefore a central player in the construction of
class and race relations in education-less conspicuous, perhaps, than
de jure segregation but just as malignant.
The de facto segregation caused by ability grouping did not go
unnoticed, as it attracted public criticism and even received legal
challenges.86 As a result, the practice of ability grouping saw a
temporary drop toward the end of the twentieth century.87 However,
ability grouping has been on the upsurge in schools all over the
country since the 2000s.8 8 Over 70 percent of fourth-grade teachers
who participated in a 2009 survey reported they had grouped students
by reading ability, up from 28 percent in 1998.89 In math, over 60
percent of fourth-grade teachers grouped students by ability in 2011,
up from 40 percent in 1996.90
Concerns about the effect of ability grouping on the
achievement gap between white and minority students have not eased
80. See id.
81. See Frank Biafora & George Ansalone, Perceptions and Attitudes of School
Principals Towards School Tracking: Structural Considerations of Personal Beliefs, 128
EDUCATION 588, 589-90 (2008).
82. See id.
83. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84. Losen, supra note 58, at 521.
85. See OAKES, supra note 3, at 286-87.
86. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
87. LOVELESS, supra note 1, at 17.
88. See id. at 16.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 17.
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with the resurgence of ability grouping in the last decade.9 ' The
evidence indicates ability grouping still correlates with socioeconomic
status, race, and ethnicity.92
Ability grouping therefore seems to aggravate educational
inequality by disadvantaging children of racial and ethnic minorities
as well as poor children. The injustice caused far exceeds the realm of
education and deeply affects students' life prospects. As a result, a
shadow of doubt falls on the desirability of ability grouping as well as
its moral permissibility.93 This Article does not take a stand on the
permissibility (or desirability) of ability grouping in general. Ability
grouping is becoming more widespread than ever, practiced routinely
in education systems with no signs of decline.94 Therefore, while
possibly not addressing all the concerns, reducing biases in the ability
grouping process is an important contribution to educational justice.9 5
III. DATA-DRIVEN ABILITY GROUPING
There are no easy ways to eliminate implicit bias in education,
as in other contexts.96 Still, technology may offer a ray of hope.
Decision-making processes that do not rely solely on human
evaluations may be able to reduce biases in these processes. Ability
grouping may be one of the practices that can benefit from new
technologies.
A. Educational Data-Driven Decision-Making
As in many other life spheres, today's core educational
activities rely increasingly on technological tools, such as digital
whiteboards, digital textbooks, educational applications, mobile
91. See Richard R. Verdugo, The Heavens May Fall: School Dropouts, the Achievement
Gap, and Statistical Bias, 43 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 184, 186 (2011).
92. See Werblow et al., supra note 58, at 272.
93. Several scholars argue to this effect. See, e.g., CAROL CORBETT BURRis & DELIA T.
GARRITY, DETRACKING FOR EXCELLENCE AND EQUITY 50-65 (2008); Jo Boaler, How a Detracked
Mathematics Approach Promoted Respect, Responsibility, and High Achievement, 45 THEORY
INTO PRAC. 40 (2006); Hamsa Venkatakrishnan & Dylan Wiliam, Tracking and Mixed-Ability
Grouping in Secondary School Mathematics Classrooms: A Case Study, 29 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J.
189, 201-02 (2003).
94. See LOVELESS, supra note 1, at 16-17.
95. One could argue that improving ability grouping would have the effect of further
securing and embedding the practice, and therefore would have a negative overall effect on
justice. However, a successful egal challenge to ability grouping in general is extremely unlikely,
so it is better to improve ability grouping somewhat, even if it is impossible to solve all its
problems.
96. See Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and
the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010).
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devices, online assessments, learning management systems (LMSs),
and social networks.97
Interactive digital educational tools, such as those mentioned
above, generate immense amounts of granular information about
students.98 This data-often called "big data"99-includes not only
consciously disclosed information, such as entries concerning grades,
behavior, and attendance, but also metadata concerning the students'
online activity. Moodle, for example, is a popular LMS that can be
used for task assignments, quizzes, content delivery, and
communication. 100 Moodle logs students' every keystroke, including
view and download commands, start and end time, time on task, and
evaluation of assignments.101
In addition to the data collected from educational computerized
platforms, further data concerning students may be accessible.
Student ID cards may collect data on activities outside the classroom,
such as purchases in the cafeteria or library loaning logs. 102 Schools
may also collect information about students from email accounts,
social media, and other noneducational sources.103 Although not yet
operational in most school systems, applications that can monitor
bodily movements and indicators such as heart rate, eye movement,
facial expressions, and posture already exist and can provide data
concerning students' physical reactions while performing educational
tasks. 104
97. Most educators welcome the integration of technology to their classroom practices.
PBS Survey Finds Teachers Are Embracing Digital Resources to Propel Student Learning, PUB.
BROAD. SERV. (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/about/blogs/news/pbs-survey-finds-teachers-are-
embracing-digital-resources-to-propel-student-learning [https://perma.ccfM4YE-EE6X].
According to one survey, three-quarters of teachers expressed positive attitudes toward the
integration of technology into the classroom. Id.
98. Elana Zeide, The Limits of Education Purpose Limitations, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 494,
505 (2017).
99. Big data is not easily defined, but in general refers to "large and complex datasets
collected from digital and conventional sources that are not easily managed by traditional
applications or processes." Jacqueleen A. Reyes, The Skinny on Big Data in Education: Learning
Analytics Simplified, 59 TECHTRENDS 75, 75 (2015).
100. See Divna Krpan & Slavomir Stankov, Educational Data Mining for Grouping
Students in E-learning System, PROC. 2012 34TH INT'L CONF. INFO. TECH. INTERFACES (ITI) 207,
208 (2012). Moodle is the acronym for Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment.
See id. at 209.
101. See id.; Zeide, supra note 98, at 505.
102. Zeide, supra note 12, at 348-49.
103. Id. at 349.
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To make sense of the quantity and diversity of data, EDM
technologies are used. EDM takes these seemingly unrelated data
and finds unexpected correlations and patterns within them.105 The
connections between students' attributes, habits, and attainment offer
opportunities for improving teaching and designing education policy:
they can identify which students need help, and of which kind; they
can inform educators about learning processes, what supports them,
and what inhibits them;106 and they help to evaluate teachers, courses,
and pedagogical methods.107 They can also inform educational policy,
enabling multidimensional analysis at a level of detail and complexity
previously unimaginable.1 0 8
One of the most dominant uses of EDM concerns assessments
of students, teachers, schools, and school districts.109  The use of
information technologies for this purpose has largely been driven by
legal requirements for data-based assessments and accountability.110
Specifically, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) imposes financial
and administrative sanctions based on student test scores and focuses
on closing the achievement gap in each school based on its
105. See Ryan S.J.D. Baker & George Siemens, Educational Data Mining and Learning
Analytics, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LEARNING SCIENCES 253, 253 (R. Keith Sawyer
ed., 2d ed. 2014). EDM refers to techniques, tools, and research designed to automatically extract
meaning from large repositories of data generated by or related to people's learning activities in
educational environments. R.S.J.D. Baker, Data Mining for Education, in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EDUCATION 112, 112-18 (B. McGaw et al. eds., 3d ed. 2010); see also Paul
Baepler & Cynthia James Murdoch, Academic Analytics and Data Mining in Higher Education,
4 INT'L J. FOR SCHOLARSHIP TEACHING & LEARNING 1, 2 (2010); F6lix Castro et al., Applying Data
Mining Techniques to e-Learning Problems, 62 STUD. COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 183,
184-85 (2007).
106. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, LEARNING WITH BIG DATA:
THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION, 2 (2014).
107. Zeide, supra note 12, at 351.
108. See CTR. FOR DIG. EDUC., BIG DATA IN EDUCATION: HARNESSING DATA FOR BETTER
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 2 (2015); FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR
EXCLUSION? 2 (2016); B.R. Prakash, M. Hanumanthappa & Vasantha Kavitha, Big Data in
Educational Data Mining and Learning Analytics, 2 INT'L J. INNOVATIVE RES. COMPUTER &
COMM. ENGINEERING 7515, 7516 (2014) (detailing the different kinds of insights EDM may offer).
109. Romero & Ventura, supra note 8, at 1-9.
110. See JULIE A. MARSH, JOHN F. PANE & LAURA S. HAMILTON, RAND CORP., MAKING
SENSE OF DATA-DRIVEN DECISION MAKING IN EDUCATION: EVIDENCE FROM RECENT RAND
RESEARCH 2 (2006), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional-papers/2006/
RANDOP17O.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3QF-VV5B]. Legally established expectations for informed
decision-making in education are not new and can be found in standards from as early as the
1980s and 1990s, which required the use of outcome data in school improvement planning and
strategic planning. See ANDY HARGREAVES & HENRY BRAUN, NATL EDUC. POLICY CTR.,
DATA-DRIVEN IMPROVEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1-6 (2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/
publication/data-driven-improvement-accountability [https://perma.cclR2NT-L629].
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demographics and achievement scores.111 To attain this goal, NCLB
requires that states measure students' achievements annually and
evaluate these achievements in light of state-established interim
achievement goals, thereby making test scores and measurable
student performance a primary concern for educators.112 Race to the
Top (RTT) also emphasizes accountability and measurement, while
turning the focus from student achievement to student growth,113 and
offers states a considerable financial incentive to implement data-use
policies and to invest in data-use infrastructure.1 14 Despite slight
differences between the two, both reforms drive the incorporation of
data-rich technologies and EDM in schools.115 In December 2015, new
federal legislation was enacted: the Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA). 116 This legislation is consistent with its predecessors, NCLB
and RTT, in encouraging the use of accurate and transparent data on
student performance.117
In addition to the ESSA, some states have also adopted policies
to encourage the use of data for informing teachers' evaluations18 and
111. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(repealed 2015); see also MARSH, PANE & HAMILTON, supra note 110, at 2.
112. NCLB § 1111(b)(2)(H). The state determines annually whether each district and
school has made "Adequate Yearly Progress" (AYP). Id.; see also Robert L. Linn et al.,
Accountability Systems: Implications of Requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 31
EDUC. RESEARCHER 3, 3-4 (2002). A school does not meet the AYP if each subgroup of students
does not improve in their proficiency levels. See NCLB § 1111(b)(2)(I); see also Linn et al., supra,
at 3-4. Failing to meet the AYP entails sanctions on the school's and district's operation and
autonomy. See Linn et al., supra, at 14.
113. DAMIAN W. BETEBENNER & ROBERT L. LINN, EDUC. TESTING SERV., GROWTH IN
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT: ISSUES OF MEASUREMENT, LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 10 (2010), http://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/
BetebennerandLinnPresenterSessionl.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2BQ-HZ7Y].
114. See HARGREAVES & BRAUN, supra note 110, at 3; Geoffrey H. Fletcher, Race to the
Top: No District Left Behind, 37 TECH. HORIZONS EDUC. J. 17, 17-18 (2010); see also MEANS ET
AL., supra note 9.
115. See HARGREAVES & BRAUN, supra note 110, at 1-6.
116. Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7981 (2012)). ESSA signifies a fundamental shift in
terms of the relations between the federal government and the states by granting states more
flexibility on issues related to accountability, resource allocation, and teacher evaluation. See AM.
FED'N OF TEACHERS, EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT: A NEW DAY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION,
https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/essa-faq.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KLC-XP5C] (last visited
Sept. 3, 2017). States will be responsible for establishing their own accountability systems,
though these must be submitted to and approved by the US Department of Education. See Paige
Kowalski, The Every Student Succeeds Act Says, "YES, Data Matter!", DATA QUALITY CAMPAIGN
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://dataqualitycampaign.org/every-student-succeeds-act-says-yes-data-matter/
[https://perma.cc/GR6J-5G68]; AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, supra.
117. See Kowalski, supra note 116.
118. See Clarin Collins & Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Putting Growth and Value-Added
Models on the Map: A National Overview, 116 TCHRS. C. REC. 1, 4 (2014) ("[Thirty] states and
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instruction-related decisions.1 19 To match the demand, a thriving
industry of assessment systems has made these technologies readily
available to teachers and schools.120
In addition to assessment and accountability driven by
legislation, the data and data mining technologies are also used by
schools for micro-decision-making,1 2 1 such as ability grouping.122
B. Can Data-Driven Ability Grouping Reduce Biases?
In light of the persistent biases that plague traditional methods
of educational decision-making, DDDM, with its purported scientific
and objective nature, may make a welcome change. Data, it is argued,
"doesn't lie"; 123 therefore, decisions based on data mining results may
be more objective and accurate than educators' judgment.124 If, as
research suggests, individuals are subconsciously prejudiced and
evaluate identical data differently according to the relevant
individual's race, social class, and sex,125 machine-generated ecisions
may be preferable.
D.C. . . . now have legislation or regulations that require student achievement data be used to
'significantly' inform the criteria for the evaluation of teacher effectiveness . . . .").
119. See Deven Carlson, Geoffrey D. Borman & Michelle Robinson, A Multistate
District-Level Cluster Randomized Trial of the Impact of Data-Driven Reform on Reading and
Mathematics Achievement, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 378, 379-80 (2011).
120. See id. at 378-79.
121. The literature often characterizes DDDM in the educational context as a practice in
which data is systematically collected, interpreted, and used for formulating action plans. Ellen
B. Mandinach, Dir., Data for Decisions Initiative, WestEd, A Perfect Time for Data Use: Using
Data-Driven Decision Making to Inform Practice, Address Before the 118th Annual Convention
of the American Psychological Association (Aug. 2010), in 47 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 71, 71 (2012).
These action plans are continuously evaluated and adjusted based on further data. See Cynthia
E. Coburn & Erica 0. Turner, The Practice of Data Use: An Introduction, 118 AM. J. EDUC. 99,
104-05 (2012). This assumes that decision makers (educators, policy makers) have access to the
data and are able to make sense of it, evaluate it, and then make informed decisions based on it.
See Ellen B. Mandinach & Edith S. Gummer, A Systemic View of Implementing Data Literacy in
Educator Preparation, 42 EDUC. RESEARCHER 30, 30-34 (2013).
122. See Vukicevic et al., supra note 8, at 146.
123. Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec'y of Educ., Address at the Fourth Annual IES Research
Conference: Robust Data Gives Us the Roadmap to Reform (June 8, 2009),
https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/robust-data-gives-us-roadmap-reform [https://perma.cc/B42L-
DF5F].
124. See Jeffrey R. Henig, The Politics of Data Use, 114 TCHRS. C. REC. 1 (2012);
Mandinach, supra note 121, at 71. The US Department of Education promotes the collection and
analysis of information generated by and about students as a means to help close achievement
gaps, increase educational opportunities and college access, and reduce discrimination against
underserved students. See MEANS ET AL., supra note 9, at 23, 25, 27.
125. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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Since the use of big data in education is in its early days, the
evidence is still not conclusive as to its effect on biases in
decision-making. However, initial evidence regarding DDAG suggests
there is room for optimism.
EVAAS-an algorithm-based learning platform-provides data
analysis services for the assessment of schooling effectiveness at the
district, school, and classroom level by using various sources of
information, including scores on standardized tests.126
EVAAS generates a multitude of assessments and predictions
on teacher effectiveness, student proficiency, probability of success,
risk of dropping out, and more.127 According to the company's website,
EVAAS is widely used to assign students to eighth-grade algebra.128
The system evaluates a student's prior achievements to predict his or
her success in higher-level courses and accordingly produces
recommendations for assigning students to ability-based groups.129
Although systems such as EVAAS have not long been
operational, research on their effect is already beginning to emerge.
One study found that 19 percent of teachers who used EVAAS data
stated that they used it for ability grouping, to differentiate
instruction according to student ability, and to provide remedial
education to those who needed it.130 EVAAS's "probability of success"
reports have also become a determinant factor in math placement
policy in at least one school district.131 Wake County in North
Carolina decided achieving a certain level of success probability on
126. See S. PAUL WRIGHT ET AL., SAS INST. INC., WHITE PAPER: SASO EVAASS
STATISTICAL MODELS 1 (2010), http://stat.wvu.edu/-wadillinger/Pres%202/EVAAS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7F9-52AA]. For example, EVAAS uses testing scores provided by major
educational testing companies and those used by states to fulfill their NCLB obligations. See
SAS, supra note 13, at 2. On the other hand, EVAAS does not have access to students' social
media activity, emails, and other online activities that are not school related. EDM, which has
access to these types of data, may improve predictability even more and offer further insights
into what makes students succeed. However, the ethical challenges that pertain to DDDM may
also be more acute when these sources of information are included. See Xin Chen, Mihaela
Vorvoreanu & Krishna Madhavan, Mining Social Media Data for Understanding Students'
Learning Experiences, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS LEARNING TECH. 246, 246 (2014).
127. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 126, at 8, 10; SAS, supra note 13, at 10.
128. See Expanding Eighth-Grade Algebra Participation, supra note 13.
129. See id.
130. Clarin Collins, Houston, We Have a Problem: Teachers Find No Value in the SAS
Education Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS@), 22 EDUC. POLy ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 14
(2014).
131. See WAKE CTY. PUB. SCH. SYS., MIDDLE SCHOOL MATH PLACEMENT GUIDELINES,
2017-18, http://www.wcpss.net/cms/libfNCO1911451/Centricity/Domain/4039fMath%
20Placement%20Guidelines%202017.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NPG-YZGJ] (last visited Sept. 3,
2017).
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EVAAS's scale would be the criterion for assigning students to an
accelerated track in math.132
Using EVAAS in assignment decisions instead of teacher
recommendations increased the rates of African American, Latino,
and low-income students in math acceleration.133 The district also
achieved proportional enrollment of female students: their enrollment
in advanced math courses reflected their proportion in the student
population.134  Importantly, the measured success rates were not
impacted by the change.135
An interesting finding concerns the reaction teachers had to
the assignment recommendation EVAAS generated: when confronted
with the assignment recommendations that EVAAS generated,
teachers expressed surprise and admitted the model identified many
students as suitable for the advanced course who otherwise would not
have been chosen.136
Naturally, further research is required to investigate the
variance between traditional methods of ability grouping and DDAG.
Still, these initial findings are encouraging and suggest DDAG may
offer opportunities for reducing biases and promoting equal
educational opportunity.
That said, the use of data in itself "is not a panacea" for all
ailments of educational inequality and may in fact create a new set of
challenges in terms of equality.137 Research into predictive analytics
and data mining in other areas suggests that instead of eliminating
biases, DDDM may reproduce them.138 For example, algorithms used
by the IRS to detect tax evaders, by police to detect potential drug
offenders, and by banks to predict debtors who will be unable to repay
their debt, have all been shown to produce predictions biased against
racial minorities and people of lower socioeconomic status.139
132. Id.
133. See Dougherty et al., supra note 13, at 87S.
134. Id. at 87-89S.
135. Id.
136. See Expanding Eighth-Grade Algebra Participation, supra note 13.
137. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 673; see Cynthia E. Coburn & Erica 0. Turner,
Research on Data Use: A Framework and Analysis, 9 MEASUREMENT 173, 173 (2011).
138. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 1, 47 (2014) [hereinafter PODESTA REPORT],
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big-data-privacyreport-may_1_20
14.pdf [https://perma.ccH23L-Y9YB]. The so-called "Podesta Report" states that data mining
may have unintended discriminatory effects: "The increasing use of algorithms to make
eligibility decisions must be carefully monitored for potential discriminatory outcomes for
disadvantaged groups, even absent discriminatory intent." Id.
139. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15; Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use
of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19
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Unequal outcomes in data-driven decisions are caused by
preexisting social inequality that is merely reflected in the algorithm's
output and by biases within the decision-making process, as is the
case in traditional decision-making. This Article refers only to the
latter and details the different ways in which this bias is created.140
1. Discriminatory Attributes
Algorithms learn how to make their predictions based on
historical datasets.141  To predict student success in a course, for
example, algorithms analyze the data of past students (called the
"training dataset") and find which attributes (or the complicated
combination thereof) best predict student success.142 If, historically,
successful participants in honors classes have been mostly white and
affluent, then the algorithm will try to locate similar candidates and
inequality will be perpetuated.143 Thus, biased decisions made in the
past, as well as historical social inequality, are captured in the
training dataset and resurface in the algorithms' predictions.1 4 4
To prevent this from happening, some algorithm scientists
suggest removing discriminatory classifications such as race, gender,
or ethnicity from the datasets.145 If the algorithm does not have access
to the racial identity of students, presumably it will not generate
racially biased decisions.
2. Attributes That Correlate with Discriminatory Classifications
The problem with removing classifications such as race or sex
from datasets is that other pieces of information that remain in the
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 850 (2017); William Isaac & Andi Dixon, Why Big-Data Analysis of
Police Activity Is Inherently Biased, SALON (May 13, 2017, 4:00 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2017/05/13/why-big-data-analysis-of-police-activity-is-inherently-
biased-partner/ [https://perma.cc/7ZFD-JLNH]; Katherine Noyes, Will Big Data Help End
Discrimination-Or Make It Worse?, FORTUNE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/15/will-
big-data-help-end-discrimination-or-make-it-worse/, [bttps://perma.cclP5FF-H9AZ].
140. As stated above, this Article does not deal with the ways in which law can address
the background inequality that affects the achievement gap. In general, biases in the process of
DDAG can be caused by problems in the data that algorithms analyze or by problems in the
design of the algorithm itself. See PODESTA REPORT, supra note 138, at 6-10.
141. See Hajian & Domingo-Ferrer, supra note 32, at 242.
142. See Romero & Ventura, supra note 8, at 7.
143. Cf. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 138, at 8.
144. KAMIRMAN & ZLIOBAITE, supra note 17; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15 at 671;
Calders & Zliobaite, supra note 30, at 4.
145. Hajian & Domingo-Ferrer, supra note 32, at 241; Verwer & Calders, supra note 27,
at 262.
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data correlate with the discriminatory attributes.146 For example,
where residential segregation is severe, zip codes serve as a proxy for
race and thus reintroduce racial bias into the algorithm's outputs.1 4 7
Removing all attributes that correlate with suspicious
classifications could prove quite challenging because the correlation
often stems from a combination of multiple types of data, such as
activity in social media, online shopping habits, and interest or
disinterest in specific online content.148 Algorithms recognize these
patterns and can obtain an accurate indication as to the individual's
sex or race, even when the suspicious attributes (and those correlating
with them) are removed.149
In addition to it being almost impossible to erase all traces of
suspicious classifications from big datasets, removing these attributes
can also be undesirable for other reasons.
First, removing certain attributes may decrease the accuracy of
the algorithmic predictions.150 This is the case when attributes that
correlate with discriminatory classifications are relevant to
educational decision-making. For example, the classification of
students as English language learners (ELLs) correlates with
immigrant status. Data on ELL eligibility may have to be excluded if
immigration status is a classification we wish to remove from the
database. This, however, is relevant data that could be important for
optimal educational decision-making. Discipline and attendance
reports may also correlate with suspicious classifications, yet they too
seem like relevant inputs for optimal educational decision-making.151
An additional reason not to remove suspicious classifications
from datasets is that the data collected can also be used for detecting
educational inequality and for a deeper understanding of the
mechanisms that create it. Removing these attributes makes it
harder to monitor and contend with inequality.152
146. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 712.
147. Id.; Verwer & Calders, supra note 27, at 262 (using the example of male-female and
high income-low income).
148. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 712.
149. See id.
150. Verwer & Calders, supra note 27, at 263.
151. See Skiba et al., supra note 73, at 333-34 (showing discipline is likely to correlate
with race because there is inequality in the application of disciplinary policy with regard to
African American students); see also, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CIVIL
RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA
COLLECTION 1 (2014), https://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-school-discipline-snapshot.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7JD-D36F] (finding that across all age groups, African American students
were suspended and expelled at a rate three times greater than white students).
152. See Verwer & Calders, supra note 27, at 263.
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3. Representation Within Data
Another challenge concerns the way members of protected
classes are represented in the data.153  A gap in technological
proficiency separates students of privileged backgrounds-who
commonly have high-quality Internet access at home-from less
fortunate students.154 Students who are less technologically proficient
devote more time and cognitive resources to typing and navigating
digital menus than to organizing and communicating ideas.155 Studies
have also found students of low-income families did not engage in
online learning resources, and those who did, did not perform as well
as their peers.156 Even though the "digital divide"-the gap between
high-income and low-income families in Internet access-is narrower
than ever,157 members of disadvantaged groups still lack the skills
required to fully benefit from online educational resources.15 8
Finally, and more generally, the data available to algorithms
are, necessarily, merely a reductive representation of an infinitely
more specific real-world object or phenomenon. These representations
may fail to capture the intricacies of reality.159 Obtaining information
rich enough to permit precise distinctions can be expensive, so data
harvested as a side effect of existing activities are preferred. For
example, data concerning the amount of time students are logged into
153. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 138, at 7-8.
154. See ELANA ZEIDE, FUTURE OF PRiVACY FORUM, 19 TIMES DATA ANALYSIS EMPOWERED
STUDENTS AND SCHOOLS: WHICH STUDENTS SUCCEED AND WHY? 11 (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Final_19Times-Data_Mar2016- .pdf [https://perma.cc/5F5L-ME3P]
(finding that minorities, students of low socio-economic status, or ELLs are likely to have limited
access to computers and Internet at home and therefore will be disadvantaged in a technology-
based learning environment).
155. SHEIDA WHITE ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE OF FOURTH-
GRADE STUDENTS IN THE 2012 NAEP COMPUTER-BASED WRITING PILOT ASSESSMENT: SCORES,
TEXT LENGTH, AND USE OF EDITING TOOLS 63 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/
subject/writing/pdf/2015119.pdf [https://perma.cclWP34-PECX]; see also ZEIDE, supra note 154,
at 11.
156. Kaveh Waddell, Virtual Classrooms Can Be as Unequal as Real Ones, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/inequaity-in-the-
virtual-classroom/501311/ [https://perma.cc/B9ZM-HCW9].
157. Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans' Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-
2015/ [https://perma.cc/7NQR-XME2] (finding that, according to census data, 84 percent of
Americans now have Internet access and that for Americans aged 18-29, that figure is 96
percent); see also Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, 13% of Americans Don't Use the Internet.
Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/GG4U-
AU5D].
158. See Waddell, supra note 156.
159. See Calders & Zliobaite, supra note 30, at 47.
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a LMS can be harvested at no cost, and, therefore, designers of
algorithms often assign that considerable weight when deciding which
students are likely to succeed (they assume that students who spend
more time logged on are more likely to succeed in the course).160
These data, however, do not necessarily communicate the whole story
about the students' academic abilities and learning habits161 and may
be biased against students from poor backgrounds who tend to spend
less time at home logged into the LMS.
The problems detailed above-concerning the data and the
limited way the data represent reality-give rise to the possibility that
DDAG may create new classes of individuals who are systematically
educationally disadvantaged. These classes will include groups which,
for some reason, are not properly represented in the data that are
available to the algorithm, such as children who participate in
after-school sports, or others. Given that educational disadvantage
affects an individual's life prospects, this concern may prove
significant.
4. Biases in the Design of the Algorithm Itself
Despite the fact that algorithms operate "independently" to
discover connections that are simply "there" in the data, they are
still-ultimately-designed and programmed by humans. Human
biases can therefore seep into the process of data mining through the
actions and decisions of the designers who program the algorithms.162
Human involvement in algorithm design occurs at all stages: defining
the attributes in the datasets, organizing the training datasets
(functions referred to in the previous section), and determining the
"question" the algorithm aims to answer.163 This framing function is
far from neutral. An algorithm used to assign students to a course, for
160. See e.g., Angela Bovo et al., Analysis of Students Clustering Results Based on Moodle
Log Data, 6TH INT'L CONF. ON EDUC. DATA MINING 306, 306 (2013); Krpan & Stankov, supra note
100.
161. Though some students may indeed spend this time learning, others may simply keep
the window open while surfing the web or engaging in an online chat.
162. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 138, at 8-10; Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1517-20 (2013).
163. This model of data mining is called classification-a predictive data mining task. See
Pedro G. Espejo, Sebastidn Ventura & Francisco Herrera, A Survey on the Application of Genetic
Programming to Classification, 40 IEEE TRANSACTIONS SYS. MAN & CYBERNETICS 121, 121
(2010). In other words, it aims to find connections among different attributes in the data that can
best predict one specified attribute-success in a course, for example. See id. To make this
prediction, the algorithm uses all the information it is fed, generates very high predictability
rates, and finds surprising correlations between attributes that would not be established
otherwise. See id.
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example, can be programmed in various different ways: it can be
asked to predict which students are most likely to succeed, it can
identify the students with the highest ability, or it can be designed to
determine which students are likely to benefit the most from the
course. The different framing entails different assignment decisions
and is therefore value-laden.
5. Why Are Biases Especially Troubling in Data-Driven Ability
Grouping?
DDAG is, therefore, also susceptible to biases. In a certain
respect, biases in DDAG are actually worse than biases in traditional
ability grouping. The purported objectivity of algorithmic
decision-making masks discrimination and prevents meaningful
debate and critique.164  As a result, discriminatory outcomes are
excused and appear benign.165
This is especially problematic in education because, unlike
other fields, the algorithms' predictions cannot be effectively verified
ex post. After identifying potential tax evaders, an algorithm-based
alert can be validated by an actual audit, and false predictions can be
detected and corrected.166  An innocent individual may be
inconvenienced by being targeted by the algorithm, but this harm is
relatively contained. Algorithms adjust as a result of these mistakes
and improve their predictions. Conversely, a prediction that leads to
the assignment of a student to a certain track does more than indicate
the student's ability: it constitutes it. Teachers made aware of
students' abilities unintentionally treat them differently in a manner
that reinforces their perceptions of students' abilities.167 Additionally,
as ability grouping most often involves studying different curricula
and allocation of unequal resources, students perceived as having
higher ability are also granted better resources and taught superior
skills, which further enhances their abilities. Disentangling the
cumulative effects of the components of educational outcomes-prior
ability, teacher expectations, differential resources, and
curriculum-is therefore well nigh impossible. This hinders the
ability to effectively validate the algorithm's initial prediction, making
164. Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Who Is Reading Whom Now: Privacy in Education
from Books to MOOCs, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 927, 984-85 (2015); Polonetsky & Tene,
supra note 12, at 31-32.
165. Id.
166. See Houser & Sanders, supra note 139, at 846-47.
167. See Lee Jussim, Stephanie Madon & Celina Chatman, Teacher Expectations and
Student Achievement: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Biases, and Accuracy, in APPLICATIONS OF
HEURISTICS AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 303, 322 (Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994).
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its outcomes virtually immune to critique.16 8 It also significantly
raises the stakes of the algorithms' decisions.
6. Possible Technological Solutions
In addition to removing suspicious classifications from the
datasets, a move that the Authors do not find promising, scientists
have begun devising technological solutions meant to contend with the
biases that algorithmic decision-making may be prone to.169
One possibility involves the manipulation of training datasets
to neutralize embedded biases. This activity in the service of equality
involves choosing borderline cases concerning protected groups and
changing their classification.170 Thus, members of racial minorities
who were not identified as suitable for higher tracks, but were close,
would be reclassified as suitable. As a result, the algorithm would
classify more members of racial minorities as suitable for higher
tracks.
A more direct approach to creating an equal outcome could also
be adopted. Algorithms can be programmed to produce equal
outcomes, such as ability groups that fully reflect the population in
terms of race, gender, or class. This would most likely entail
modifying the decision threshold (for instance, average test scores),
defining a different threshold of perceived ability for different ethnic
or socioeconomic classes.17 1 Doing so would immediately change the
rate of children from racial minorities or low-income families assigned
to higher tracks. This would also inevitably mean allocating fewer
seats in higher tracks for students from privileged backgrounds
(assuming that seats are limited).
Technologically, the problem with these two approaches
(manipulating training datasets and producing predetermined equal
outcomes) is they may decrease the algorithm's predictive accuracy.
Assuming at least some of the inequality represented in the historical
dataset or in current decisions results from actual social inequality
rather than biases in decision-making, the algorithm would have to
168. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 181 (2016) (discussing possible methods of
verification as an alternative to measures promoting transparency in algorithms).
169. See Hajian & Domingo-Ferrer, supra note 32, at 242-43; Verwer & Calders, supra
note 27, at 263-68.
170. Hajian & Domingo-Ferrer, supra note 32, at 247-51.
171. Verwer & Calders, supra note 27, at 263.
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consider race as a criterion for assignment recommendations and to
apply different rules to students of different races.172
Arguably, a small decrease in accuracy should be tolerated if it
leads to an improvement in equality. However, assuming ability
grouping has a pedagogical justification, nonnegligible decreases in
accuracy would be countereffective: they would entail assigning
students to tracks unsuited to their ability and that do not fulfill their
educational needs.
These solutions' differential treatments of individuals
according to race also raise significant legal challenges, which are
addressed in Part IV.
Another possible technological solution involves developing
completely novel ways to group students. Typically, students are
grouped according to their perceived abilities as evaluated by previous
attainment or tests.173 But algorithms can also offer other possibilities
for grouping students, such as clustering them according to attributes
other than ability. Clustering is a descriptive data mining model that
groups together students with similar attributes.174 These similarities
would typically include, among other factors, their grades, knowledge
in a particular field, capabilities, and skillsets,175 but could also
include more surprising categorizations such as learning styles,176
habits, hobbies, and the like.177 While this method would need to be
empirically tested for pedagogical effectiveness, it offers a novel
approach to grouping that may have a positive effect in terms of social
integration.
172. If, on the other hand, inequality is caused wholly by biases in the process of
decision-making, then these practices may actually improve accuracy.
173. Drowatzky, supra note 26, at 45-47.
174. See Neha D. & B.M. Vidyavathi, A Survey on Applications of Data Mining Using
Clustering Techniques, 126 INT'L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 7, 7 (2015). "The clusters that are
formed need to satisfy the following two principles: 1) Homogeneity: Elements of the same
cluster are maximally close to each other. 2) Separation: Data elements in separate clusters are
maximally far apart from each other." Id.
175. Id. at 9.
176. loannis Magnisalis et al., Adaptive and Intelligent Systems for Collaborative
Learning Support: A Review of the Field, 4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS LEARNING TECH. 5, 8 (2011). See
generally Sofiane Amara et al., Using Students' Learning Style to Create Effective Learning
Groups in MCSCL Environments, 1ST NAT'L CONF. ON EMBEDDED & DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
(2015) (discussing the different methods of learning about students' learning styles).
177. See Romero & Ventura, supra note 8, at 9; see also Vukicevic et al., supra note 8, at
189; Ashish Dutt et al., Clustering Algorithms Applied in Educational Data Mining, 5 INT'L J.
INFO. & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING 112, 113 (2015); Li Li, Xiangfeng Luo & Haiyan Chen,
Clustering Students for Group-Based Learning in Foreign Language Learning, 9 INT'L J.
COGNITIVE INFORMATICS & NAT. INTELLIGENCE 55, 56-57 (2015).
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As big data mining develops generally, and in the educational
domain specifically, further technological solutions may be developed
that might contend with inequality created through data mining.
IV. LEGAL REGULATION OF DATA-DRIVEN ABILITY GROUPING
After understanding the promises and pitfalls of big data for
ability grouping, this Article examines two possible ways in which law
can be instrumental in ensuring DDAG reduces biases and promotes
equality: challenging cases in which DDAG results in racially biased
decisions and regulating the design and practice of DDAG. This
Article argues that legal challenges to unequal outcomes of DDAG are
unlikely to be successful and suggests that the second strategy,
namely regulating the design and practice of DDAG, is more
promising.
A. Challenging Data-Driven Ability Grouping
The first way in which law can be instrumental in contending
with inequality is through launching legal challenges to specific
decisions or policies. This option, however, is unlikely to prove
effective in the case of DDAG. The segregatory effects of traditional
ability grouping policies have been challenged in courts several times,
and though successful in some cases (to be detailed shortly), courts
have, as a rule, upheld practices of ability grouping.1 7 8 The difficulty
to prove intentional discrimination and the continued disagreement
among education experts as to the desirability of ability grouping have
made the courts reluctant to strike down ability grouping policy. 17 9
DDAG is even more likely to withstand judicial review since it makes
proving intentional discrimination even harder and arguably improves
the grouping process by reducing race and class biases.
The first and most publicly known case to deal with the
discriminatory effect of ability grouping was the 1969 case of Hobson
v. Hansen.18 0 The case challenged an ability grouping policy in the
District of Columbia in which students were assigned to one of several
tracks-from "basic" to "honors"-based on intelligence, achievement,
and aptitude test scores.18 1 The policy resulted in blatant segregation
in schools: the higher tracks served an overwhelming majority of
178. See Losen, supra note 58, at 527-35.
179. See id.
180. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
181. See id. at 406-07.
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white students, whereas African American students were assigned
mostly to lower tracks.182 The district court ruled that although
ability grouping was not illegal per se, the District of Columbia
program violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.183
In thus deciding, the court stressed the plaintiffs had been the victims
of racial segregation throughout their prior education, and therefore,
the tests used to perform the grouping did not give an accurate
estimation of their ability.184 The court also found "that education in
the lower tracks was so watered-down as to be more fairly described
as 'warehousing,"'185 and the program did not involve review of the
initial assignment decisions.186 Therefore, the use of ability grouping
in Hobson could not be understood as a temporary measure meant to
help students overcome the educational disadvantage they suffered
through segregation.
In Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, a court was faced
with ability grouping in a recently desegregated school district.187
Here, the previously white school absorbed all students and continued
a grouping system it practiced prior to desegregation, which comprised
eleven homogeneous levels.188 Tracking in principle was not held to be
illegal in this case either; instead, the decision to strike down the
policy was based on the fact that the students who studied in
segregated schools had received inferior prior education.189
Despite these successes, the applicability of these precedents
was critically limited in subsequent cases.190 The Hobson court was
clear that ability grouping is not unlawful per se'9 1 and that it is a
legitimate education policy when it is reasonably related to a
legitimate educational objective and implemented in a nonarbitrary,
noncapricious, and nondiscriminatory way. The subsequent
jurisprudence distinguished school districts operating under
preexisting desegregation orders from those that had reached unitary
182. See id. at 456.
183. Id. at 511.
184. Id. at 514 ("[R]ather than being classified according to ability to learn, these
students are in reality being classified ... according to environmental and psychological factors
which have nothing to do with innate ability." (emphasis added)).
185. See Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
186. See id.
187. See Moses v. Washington Par. Sch. Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340, 1340 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd, 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972).
188. Id. at 1341.
189. Id. at 1345.
190. See Losen, supra note 58, at 529.
191. See Smuck, 408 F.2d at 186.
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status or had never been under desegregation orders.1 92  In school
districts operating under a desegregation order, evidence of
segregation in ability grouping raises a presumption of discriminatory
intent and, therefore, the burden of proof shifts to the district to show
that the policy is not a vestige of that original discrimination.19 3 On
the other hand, this presumption does not apply to districts operating
under unitary status for sufficient time.194
In NAACP v. Georgia, the ability grouping practice involved
students who had not attended segregated schools themselves, despite
the fact that the district was under a desegregation order and had not
achieved unitary status.195 The court found that segregation could not
be blamed for the inequality in educational abilities that was reflected
in the racially disparate grouping outcomes.196 The fact that the
students' parents attended segregated schools and the school district
still had not achieved unitary status was deemed irrelevant to the
current grouping system.197 More importantly, the court deferred to
the district's opinion that ability grouping was a legitimate
educational practice (including tracking students as early as
kindergarten), and moreover, that ability grouping could offer
remedial education for racial minorities.198
Since NAACP, challenges to practices of tracking based on
racial imbalance have been tough battles to win without proof of
192. See Losen, supra note 58, at 530.
193. See Simmons ex rel. Simmons v. Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (E.D. Ark. 1994)
("Ability grouping which results in racial segregation may be permitted in an otherwise unitary
school system if the school district can demonstrate that its ability grouping is not based on the
present results of past segregation or that it will remedy such results through better education
opportunities."). Cases involving ability grouping in school districts under desegregation orders
also include objections to districts' motions seeking unitary status; courts sometimes grant
unitary status despite the district's failure to satisfy all the requirements. See, e.g., Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
194. McNeal v. Tate Cty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (5th Cir. 1975). In McNeal,
the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the prohibition of an ability grouping
practice because the district failed to show that its student assignment methods were "not based
on the present results of past segregation." Id. (emphasis added). However, this statement was
not intended as a hard-and-fast rule, and the court did leave space for cases in which evidence
might show that a given system of grouping is in students' best interests. Id.
195. Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-14
(11th Cir. 1985); see also Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 127, 130
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding that past segregation could not be blamed for ability grouping's disparate
impact because the school district had been under a desegregation order for twenty years).
196. NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1414, 1416.
197. Id. at 1414-15.
198. Id. at 1410, 1419.
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intent to discriminate.199  Courts have repeatedly upheld ability
grouping policies despite the racial imbalance that ensued.200 And
while school districts that were under desegregation orders in the past
are "considerably more vulnerable to equal protection arguments"
than those that were not, willingness to intervene even in those cases
is small.20 1  Equal protection challenges therefore have become
ineffective unless intentional discrimination can be proved.202
199. See Quarles v. Oxford Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 868 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[A]bility grouping has been recognized by both courts and educators as an acceptable and
commonly used instruction method"); Montgomery, 854 F.2d at 130 ("We are impressed
particularly with the testimony ... [that] achievement grouping is far superior to ability
grouping."); NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1419 ("The district court's findings of the educational soundness
of interclass ability arrangements per se are not clearly erroneous. The record discloses that such
grouping permits more resources to be routed to lower achieving students in the form of lower
pupil-teacher ratios and additional instructional materials."). But see United States v. Yonkers
Bd. of Educ., 123 F. Supp. 2d 694, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that since ability grouping in the
district was based on teachers' "attitudes and expectations" that could be traced to prior
segregation, the ability groups themselves were a form of segregation); Simmons ex rel. Simmons
v. Hooks, 843 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (applying the McNeal test and finding that
tracking could not remedy the results of past discrimination).
200. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir. 1997);
Price v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1313 (5th Cir. 1991) (ruling that once the school
system has been held "unitary," the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a newly adopted
student assignment plan with a disparate impact on minorities is intentionally discriminatory);
Quarles, 868 F.2d at 754 (conceding that there was "a high concentration of white students in the
upper level groups" and a high concentration "of Black students in the lower level groups," but
holding that this was not a result of the school's former segregated system).
201. See Losen, supra note 58, at 532. The stronger protection offered in districts that
were segregated does not apply to a growing number of racial and ethnic minority children whose
ancestors did not attend segregated schools, either because they did not reside in southern states
or because they immigrated to the United States after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954). See, e.g., Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 998 (5th Cir. 1981). In Castaneda, the
tests used for ability grouping in the Raymondville Independent School District (RISD) were
administered entirely in English, so all ELLs were placed in the "low-ability" group. Id. The US
District Court for the Southern District of Texas nonetheless ruled in favor of RISD. Id. at 1015.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit partially reversed on other grounds. See id.; see also Douglas S.
Reed, Legal and Pedagogical Contexts of English Learners: Defining "Appropriate Action" Under
the Equal Educational Opportunity Act 11 (Mar. 29, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
202. Losen, supra note 58, at 529. Angelia Dickens suggests that the Court should adopt
a belief in the "funda mentality of education" adopted by Justice Marshall in his dissent in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 116 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), and further argues that the practice constitutes a classification based on race that
should be subject to strict scrutiny. See Angelia Dickens, Note, Revisiting Brown v. Board of
Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America's Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 469, 485, 488 (1996). Thus, under Dickens's formulation, a school district would be
required to show that ability grouping is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
See id. at 500. In her view, a district will likely not be able to establish a compelling interest for
tracking; therefore, an Equal Protection challenge to ability grouping under her framework for
strict scrutiny analysis would likely succeed. Id.
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Claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964203
are also insufficient for challenging racial biases in ability grouping.
Title VI does not require proof of intentional discrimination and can
apply when ability grouping results in significant levels of classroom
segregation.204 However, policies causing an indirect disparate impact
can be redeemed, according to Title VI, if they are justified from an
educational perspective and are the least segregatory out of equally
effective educational alternatives.2 0 5 As previously noted, courts have
deferred to professional expertise as to whether ability grouping is
overall better for studentS206 and have refrained from seriously
considering the possibility that even good faith efforts at grouping
could be biased.207
Courts' acceptance of ability grouping as a legitimate
educational practice-even when it results in racial segregation-is a
key barrier to legal challenges of the practice. The view taken by
courts impedes Title VI claims and prevents bringing forward claims
according to the rational basis test, which applies both to
nonsuspicious classifications, such as socioeconomic class,208 and when
the rights that are being infringed upon are not "fundamental."209 To
successfully challenge a state action, plaintiffs are required to prove
that it bears no rational relation to a legitimate governmental
interest.210 This would be nearly impossible to prove, considering
203. Title VI is a general antidiscrimination law that bars discrimination on the basis of
race and national origin in programs and services operated by recipients of federal financial
assistance. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252, 252-53 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)). Ability grouping policies or processes that operate to
discriminate on the basis of student gender are also prohibited by Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972. See Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat.
373, 373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (2012)).
204. See 34 C.F.R § 100.3(b)(2) (2017). However, the efficacy of Title VI disparate impact
claims has been questioned. See, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLuM. L.
REV. 374, 396 (2007).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City of
New York, 463 U.S. 582, 624 n.15 (1983).
206. See Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir.
1988). In the NAACP case, the court referred to both equal protection claims and claims under
Title VI. Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1408 (11th Cir.
1985). The court ruled that a racially disparate grouping system did not violate Title VI because
grouping was necessary to meet the needs of the student population and was an "accepted
pedagogical practice." Id. at 1418 (quoting the district court record).
207. Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1318, 1326 (1989).
208. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1973).
209. Id. at 51.
210. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The Court's application
of the rational basis test has made it so permissive that it is practically unusable. In one case,
the Court explained that "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
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courts have repeatedly accepted ability grouping as a legitimate, and
therefore rational, policy choice.
Existing equal protection jurisprudence, therefore, has been
largely ineffective in safeguarding equality of opportunity for
disadvantaged groups. As the United States moves away from the
painful history of de jure segregation, the possibility of courts applying
a stricter standard of review decreases even more. In the case of
DDAG, the existing doctrines are even less likely to be effective in
challenging the unequal effects of ability grouping. Algorithmic
decision-making is perceived as scientific and objective; therefore,
courts are even more likely to defer to the grouping decisions made by
algorithms, which renders both Title VI and the rational basis test
under the Due Process Clause ineffective.2 11 Moreover, intentional
discrimination can easily be disguised in algorithmic decision-making
a rational basis" for a challenged law, it will survive rational basis review. Id. Moreover, the
Court stated that it was irrelevant whether the rationale given for the challenged distinction
actually motivated the legislature, suggesting that any plausible reason can suffice, whether or
not it was the true reason for legislation. See id.; see also Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality
Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of
the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2011). Additionally, the standard of proof
required of plaintiffs is extremely high, creating a "virtually irrebuttable presumption of
constitutionality under the rational basis test." Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the
Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898, 908 (2005). In short, the rational basis test is
extremely unlikely to be helpful in addressing cases of racial bias in ability grouping. As
Jackson, supra, at 493, notes, "the Court has essentially made the rational basis test the
equivalent to no test at all." But see Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the
Supreme Court from the 1971 Terms Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999)
(counting ten cases in twenty-five years in which this rational basis "with a bite" has been
applied, in contrast to the one hundred cases in which it has been rejected); Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972) (noting that there have been several cases over the
years in which courts have applied a more stringent version of the rational basis test); Gayle
Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62
IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
211. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 677. At first glance, EDM seems extremely
successful in terms of the rational basis test, as it is a good predictor of educational success.
There is, however, something special in algorithmic decision-making that raises doubt as to the
appropriateness of the rational basis test as a matter of principle. The "point of data mining is to
provide a rational basis upon which to distinguish between individuals and to reliably confer to
the individual the qualities possessed by those who seem statistically similar." Id. The statistical
correlations that algorithms find are always rational in the sense that they are statistically
valid. Therefore, any finding of an algorithm is rational and passes the legal test. However, its
inexplicable "black box" nature raises doubt as to whether decisions generated from it can satisfy
the rational basis test. For a mechanism to be rational, it must offer some substantive
explanation for its decisions. See Farrell, supra note 210, at 383. Another problem is that in each
and every prediction offered by the algorithm, the explanation for why its predictions always
supposedly satisfy the rational basis test would be "because the algorithm said so." Absent a
possibility to sometimes fail the test, the rational basis test seems to have no meaning at all:
when everything is rational, nothing is rational.
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behind complicated correlations.2 12  Therefore, attempts to utilize
ability grouping to preserve racial and class segregation would be even
harder to combat.
Another important barrier in placing challenges before DDAG
is the lack of transparency of algorithms. Several scholars advocate
for promoting due process rights in DDDM. 213 The key, it seems, is
ensuring decision makers, as well as individuals affected by the
decision, can review and challenge the decision. For this,
transparency and interpretability are crucial. Transparency,214
through code disclosure or otherwise, will enable educators to review
the data and make decisions based on it without surrendering their
discretion to machines. Transparency will also enable students to
access their information, correct it, and know how they are rated.215
The problem with requiring transparency is that algorithms
are extremely opaque, making disclosure only minimally helpful.
Hence, a precursory requirement for fostering transparency is
interpretability.2 16 The outcome and the way it was reached should be
simplified-perhaps through graphic display-so that students,
parents, and teachers can understand it.217 The complex processes are
not only inaccessible in terms of human understanding but also are
often legally protected trade secrets-blocking anything but very
general descriptions of the processes leading to the predictions.218 As
a result, students affected by the algorithms' recommendations have
limited ability to understand the rationale behind the decision and to
challenge it.219 Making the factors that are considered by algorithms
212. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682 (2017).
213. See e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Zarsky, supra note
162, at 1547.
214. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
215. See id.; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 24 (2014).
216. See Philipp Hacker, Nudge 2.0-The Future of Behavioural Analysis of Law, in
Europe and Beyond: A Review of 'Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective', 24 EUR. REV.
PRIV. L. 297, 308-09 (2016); Richard H. Thaler & Will Tucker, Smarter Information, Smarter
Consumers, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2013.
217. See Julia Stoyanovich & Ellen P. Goodman, Revealing Algorithmic Rankers,
FREEDOM TO TINKER (Aug. 5, 2016), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/08/05/revealing-
algorithmic-rankers/ [https://perma.cc/6QRR-WJT5] (arguing that transparency, wherein the
rules of operation of an algorithm are more or less apparent, or even fully disclosed, still leaves
stakeholders in the dark). Instead, Stoyanovich and Goodman advocate for interpretability
"which rests on making explicit the interactions between the program and the data on which it
acts." Id.
218. See PASQUALE, supra note 214, at 14-15.
219. See Barocas & Serbst, supra note 15, at 696.
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publicly known might also allow for strategic behavior aimed at
getting high scores.220
Finally, due process rights inevitably entail reintroducing
human biases into the decision-making process. If teachers are able to
override algorithms' recommendations and assign children who were
not identified by the algorithm to a higher track, it would not be
surprising if this discretion were practiced more often in favor of
children from privileged families.
It is also likely that allowing students to appeal DDAG
decisions would benefit children of privileged families, because they
are typically better equipped to take advantage of due process rights
than students from disadvantaged families.
The discussion above suggests that challenging specific
assignment decisions using traditional doctrines of equal protection is
unlikely to succeed in ensuring that DDAG will promote educational
equality and decrease biases. Law may be more effective in ensuring
these goals by being involved in the design and implementation of the
algorithms used in ability grouping. To this end, this Article suggests
integrating technological solutions and legal regulation.
B. Regulating the Design and Implementation of Data-Driven Ability
Grouping
Challenging assignment decisions or ability grouping policies
in courts is not a promising route for promoting equality. Instead, this
Article argues that law can be more effective if it is involved in the
design and application of DDAG. The development and design of
algorithms that are sensitive to equality are in their first steps. As a
result, this Article does not purport to offer any comprehensive
solution here. Instead, it aims to describe what such future solutions
may look like and offers some insights into the way technological and
legal solutions ought to be integrated to achieve the ultimate goal.
Algorithms function as policies.221 They determine criteria for
allocating certain resources or entitlements which are then applied to
individuals. They are much easier to regulate than human
decision-making because once the criteria are set and the weight given
to each attribute is assigned, the algorithm reliably follows its own
rules. Although this does not prevent biases from infiltrating-as
described at length above-it does mean that technological
intervention to correct biases can be effective, as opposed to
220. See PASQUALE, supra note 214, at 217.
221. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1254 (2008).
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irreparably biased human decision-making. These characteristics
make it possible to envisage DDAG as a means to promote equality in
education.
Legal intervention is required in the design of
equality-sensitive algorithms for two main reasons. First, designing
equality-sensitive algorithms entails normative determinations that
legal doctrine and scholarship are best equipped to make. Second,
legal regulation ensures universal implementation. Creating the
technological tools to decrease biases requires expertise and may be
costly, so legal regulation is essential to ensure that all schools and
school districts using DDDM implement bias-reducing systems.
Scientists are aware of the biases that may be perpetuated by
EDM and have begun devising technological solutions.222  These
attempts are commendable because developing technological solutions
can optimize DDAG and promote educational equality. But these
solutions inherently involve a myriad of normative decisions that law
needs to address: Which groups warrant special attention (race,
gender, class)? What does an equal or fair outcome consist of-equal
shares or something different? Is differential treatment acceptable?
For example, an algorithm may be designed to assign zero
weight to race, arguably creating a race-neutral assignment
mechanism. Conversely, algorithms can be designed to create equal
racial representation, thus instating differential criteria for students
of different racial groups. A third possibility involves manipulating
the historical datasets and offsetting some of the existing bias. Each
choice will result in different outcomes-in terms of both specific
assignment decisions and in the level of segregation in the education
system as a whole. The choice between the different options is not
technological but normative. Each choice expresses a different
understanding of what fair assignment policy requires.
Unfortunately, research on these issues in the computer
science community has not had recourse to the highly sophisticated
and developed legal doctrine and scholarship.223 As a result, these
efforts may fail to appropriately address the problems identified in
DDAG. Technological solutions must meet the goals set by normative
and legal dictates. Legal involvement is important not only to direct
222. See supra Part III.B.
223. For an attempt at integrating legal and technological perspectives in discovering
discrimination, see Dino Pedreschi, Salvatore Ruggieri & Franco Turini, The Discovery of
Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING
AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES, supra note 17, at 91. For a general overview of this area,
also see the other chapters of DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA
MINING AND PROFILING IN LARGE DATABASES, supra note 17.
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the design of algorithms but also to ensure that effective technological
solutions are uniformly applied to all cases of DDAG.
To design algorithms that will reduce biases, we must consider
a complicated set of empirical questions including, but not limited to,
whether applying equal criteria to all children imposes differential
burdens on children of diverse background; whether students have
been exposed to prior injustice; what is the threshold of ability
required for benefiting from a course; and what the side effects will be
of each mode of assignment. The answers to these empirical questions
are to be found within the expertise of educators and social scientists.
The normative discussion must react to these facts, determining the
normative commitments and the legal framework within which they
can be realized.
Earlier, the Authors distinguished unequal outcomes caused by
social inequality (which existed before the grouping decision and is
unrelated to it) from those caused by biases in the decision-making
process.224 This distinction resurfaces now, when the Authors are
required to decide whether to design algorithms merely to reduce
biases within the grouping process or to engage in the more ambitious
task of minimizing the reflection of social inequality in ability
grouping.225
Designing algorithms to correct anything but biases in the
decision-making process itself may reasonably be classified as
affirmative action, which in the current legal atmosphere is a
"nonstarter."226 Courts have struck down policies that treat members
of different racial groups differently even when this differential
treatment was designed to facilitate integration and promote equal
opportunity.227 To withstand strict scrutiny, educational policy that
gives preferential treatment to racial minorities must promote a
compelling state interest and be sufficiently narrowly tailored.228 In
the seminal case of Parents Involved, the Supreme Court struck down
assignment policies in two school districts that considered students'
race in assigning them to schools, even though this policy's objective
was to promote racial diversity.2 2 9 In striking down the policy, the
224. See supra Part II.B, particularly notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
225. This involves cases when the algorithm "goes too 'right,"' as Barocas and Selbst put
it, and social inequality is to blame for the unequal outcome. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at
729. Achieving equal outcome despite social inequality would require, as noted above, decreasing
the predictive accuracy of algorithms. See supra Part III.B.6.
226. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 15, at 715.
227. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742
(2007).
228. See id.
229. See id. at 710-11.
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Court stated it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored,230 and while
race may be considered, it could only constitute one consideration
among many-students must be evaluated holistically rather than
merely according to their race.231 Following Parents Involved, the US
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights and the US
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division issued joint Diversity
Guidelines for school districts, in which they detail the measures
school districts may adopt to promote diversity in a constitutional
manner.232 The guidelines advise school districts first to examine
race-neutral measures and then use generalized race-based
approaches that do not refer to any specific student.233 Individualized
racial examination should be used as a last resort and be narrowly
tailored to the district's specific goals.2 3 4 In these cases race may be
considered alongside other considerations in assessing a student's
assignment.235  These guidelines do not refer explicitly to ability
grouping, but the rationale seems to apply directly. They suggest that
as long as race is merely one consideration among many others and
students are evaluated holistically, school districts are allowed to
consider it in order to realize the compelling state interest of racial
integration.2 36
Since algorithms incorporate multiple considerations other
than race, it seems that some of the means to promote racial equality
in assignment may withstand strict scrutiny under Parents Involved.
Additionally, while the focus on race is understandable, it is
important to keep in mind that racial disparities are not the only
inequalities that ability grouping recreates. Children of lower
socioeconomic class are also overrepresented in lower tracks, as are
immigrants. Gender inequality is also an issue, especially in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) courses. These
classifications are not probed as strictly by courts, requiring only
230. Id. at 726. Four of the five majority justices went further to state that racial
diversity was not a compelling state interest. Id. at 730-32. Justice Kennedy, however, joined the
dissent in asserting that integration was a compelling state interest. Id. at 788-89 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This case has been subject to wide scholarly
critique. See, e.g., Philip Tegeler, The 'Compelling Government Interest' in School Diversity:
Rebuilding the Case for an Affirmative Government Role, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021 (2014).
231. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723.
232. See CIviL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, & OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID
RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/1ist/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8LV-8YAJ].
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intermediate scrutiny (in the case of gender and nationality) or the
lenient rational basis test in the case of socioeconomic status.237 As a
result, it would seem algorithms designed to correct biases would
withstand judicial review.
To conclude, DDAG is a case in which legal intervention can be
most effective in the stage of design and policy making. To make the
most of what DDAG has to offer, though, cooperation is needed among
scientists, educators, and lawyers. Bridging this professional gap is
the practical challenge currently confronting policy makers.
V. CONCLUSION
Brown marked the beginning of the end of de jure segregation
in the United States. But segregation in education did not end;
rather, it underwent modification. Attending the same school is
hardly a remedy for school segregation if African Americans and
whites are separated upon entering the schoolhouse doors. Regardless
of the policy's alleged neutrality, minorities are disadvantaged by
tracking when the assignment of students creates separate and
racially identifiable classrooms, which, in turn, provides minorities
with fewer educational resources and opportunities and inferior life
prospects.
Technological developments, more specifically EDM, have the
potential to improve the ability grouping process and to begin to
deliver long-promised educational justice to all children. Whether
DDAG will ultimately succeed depends on multiple factors, of which
legal regulation is only one. Educators and regulators alike must
watch the implementation of DDAG carefully and adjust its design as
its effects become known. If, after all, DDAG is unable to promote
equality of opportunity and decrease segregation-both between and
within schools-there may be no choice but to revisit the struggle to
eliminate ability grouping altogether.
237. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973) (deciding
that socioeconomic status was not a suspicious classification that triggers strict or intermediate
scrutiny). Noting the difference in jurisprudence between categories of race and class, several
writers suggest promoting equality and diversity by using socioeconomic class instead of race.
See Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-Parents
Involved, 59 S.C. L. REV. 841 (2008); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of
Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277 (2009); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and
Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131 (2007); Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 HOW. L.J. 251 (2008); Lauren
E. Winters, Colorblind Context: Redefining Race-Conscious Policies in Primary and Secondary
Education, 86 OR. L. REV. 679 (2007).
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